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Unreasonable Probability of Error
Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. 2000).
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court sought to create a
uniform standard to guarantee effective assistance of counsel to criminal
defendants, to "ensure a fair trial," and to assure the reliability of "a just
result."' Justice O'Connor's majority opinion created a two-pronged test
for overturning a trial verdict: deficient performance and resulting
prejudice. The Court explicitly established a difficult burden for proving
deficient performance, but set a moderate standard for prejudice as the
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." 3 The Court elaborated that this standard is lower than
preponderance.' Thus, for penalty-phase ineffectiveness claims, a defendant
may establish prejudice without having to "show that counsel's deficient
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." 5 For guilt-
phase ineffectiveness, the standard drops from reasonable probability to
reasonable doubt.6
While Strickland may have been a good faith attempt to balance the
right to counsel with judicial efficiency, the system still does not ensure
reliability or justice One reason for this national crisis is that too many
I. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
2. Id. at 689 ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.").
3. Id. at 694.
4. Counsel's deficient performance may be prejudicial "even if the errors of counsel cannot
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." Id
5. Id. at 693.
6. Id. at 695.
7. More and more horror stories about incompetent counsel, wrongly convicted death row
inmates, and institutional failures have filled the pages of law journals and newspapers over the
last few years. E.g., JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000); Stephen Bright, Counsel for
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
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lower federal and state courts have consistently misinterpreted, misapplied,
undercut, or ignored parts of Strickland. In Coleman v. State, the Indiana
Supreme Court offered a disturbing example of this pattern, despite the U.S.
Supreme Court's intervention. After analyzing Coleman and surveying the
errors by courts around the country, I suggest ways to clarify Strickland and
to improve its application, both in general and for death sentence cases.
I
Alton Coleman's case is hardly the most sympathetic one on death row.
In 1986, he was sentenced to death for murdering a seven-year-old girl and
raping and attempting to murder her ten-year-old relative! The judge and
jury, however, never heard the whole story, which included solid mitigating
evidence. Coleman's childhood was horrific. His mother and grandmother
were prostitutes who severely sexually and physically abused him.9 His
mother prostituted him in his adolescence, and his grandmother physically
abused him and struck him on the head with a baseball bat on several
occasions.'0 The abuse may have compounded other head injuries for which
he was hospitalized. Medical experts diagnosed him with organic brain
damage, Borderline Personality Disorder, and psychosis."
But Coleman's court-appointed lawyers, Cornell Collins and Lonnie
Randolph, never presented any of this evidence. They investigated no
mitigating evidence whatsoever. In the penalty phase of the trial, Randolph
offered only brief religious and moral arguments against the death penalty,
and at the sentencing hearing, he added simply that Coleman should "be
spared and studied" as a psychological specimen. 2 The two lawyers also
botched the guilt phase of the trial. 3
The Indiana Supreme Court made four errors in its application of
Strickland in Coleman's 1998 appeal. First, it erred in applying an unduly
difficult burden for prejudice from Lockhart v. Fretwell.t4 The U.S.
1835 (1994); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Counsel, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases
Raises Doubts About the System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al; Frederic N. Tulsky, Big-Time
Trials, Small-Time Defenders, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1992, at Al.
8. He has also been convicted of murders in Ohio and Illinois.
9. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 18, Coleman v. Mitchell, No. 3:99CV0410 (N.D.
Ind. filed Apr. 13, 2001) (petitioning from Coleman, 741 N.E.2d 697).
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 20-21.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Despite being informed that state investigators had found potentially exculpatory hair
evidence at the scene of the crime, they never investigated or presented this evidence. Coleman v.
State, 703 N.E.2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ind. 1998).
14. 506 U.S. 364, 369-72 (1993). The Indiana Supreme Court, and many courts around the
country, had mistakenly applied Fretwell to require defendants to prove, above and beyond
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Supreme Court ultimately granted a writ of certiorari on this question in
Coleman, and vacated and remanded it in light of Williams v. Taylor.'6
There were three other errors for which the Court did not grant certiorari.
First, the Indiana Supreme Court had not reviewed the ineffective
assistance claim de novo, despite Strickland's explicit statement that
ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. Such questions
are entitled to de novo review, and "no special standards ought to apply to
ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings." " Instead, the Indiana
Supreme Court applied a highly deferential standard to the lower court's
ruling on ineffectiveness in its own state habeas review."8 Second, the
Indiana Supreme Court had failed to apply Strickland's reasonable doubt
standard for prejudice during the guilt phase. 9 The Indiana Supreme
Court's final error was in its application of Strickland's reasonable
probability standard to the death penalty phase, by failing to state that the
petitioner was not required to prove prejudice by a preponderance of the
evidence.2" As a result of these errors, the court required Coleman to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by ineffective counsel by much more
than a reasonable probability.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on these
questions, it did address some of them in Williams, in light of which
Coleman's case was remanded. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
specified that if a court required a preponderance of the evidence for an
ineffective assistance claim, such a decision would be contrary to clearly
established precedent, and would be a prime example of a ground for
habeas relief.2" Despite the Supreme Court's clear articulation, the Indiana
Supreme Court repeated these mistakes in Coleman's remand.22
Strickland's two-pronged test, that their trials were "fundamentally unfair." These courts ignored
the fact that Fretwell clearly applied only to a very exceptional set of circumstances.
15. Coleman v. Indiana, 529 U.S. 1085 (2000).
16. 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding that Fretwell modified the Strickland standard only for
unusual "windfall" cases of ineffectiveness). In the interests of full disclosure, I note that I co-
wrote the petition for certiorari with Bob Lancaster, who was the Robert Cover Fellow at the
Jerome Frank Legal Services Organization.
17. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).
18. Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022, 1032 (Ind. 1998) ("[A] petitioner appealing from the
denial of post-conviction relief labors under a heavy burden. We conclude that the evidence does
not lead 'unerringly and unmistakenly to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court,'
and that 'the court's findings are sufficient to support the judgment."') (citations omitted). This
ruling is particularly striking because the lower court had never given the ineffectiveness claim a
full hearing in the first place. The Indiana Supreme Court was the first court to review the issue
and the facts, and thus, the court was trying to defer to a lower court ruling against Coleman that
did not exist. See id. at 1027.
19. Id. at 1029-30.
20. ld at 1031-32.
21. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
22. The court correctly removed any reference to Fretwell and its more difficult prejudice
standard, but the court explicitly rejected the use of de novo review for Coleman's ineffectiveness
claim and offered an incoherent argument that misunderstood Williams. Coleman, 741 N.E.2d at
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The Indiana Supreme Court is not unique in its misapplication of
Strickland. Other courts have rejected de novo review for ineffective
assistance claims.23 Over the last ten years, the First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits have contradicted Strickland by requiring
preponderance for the penalty phase and the guilt phase.2" The circuits have
rarely cited the reasonable doubt standard for the guilt phase, an
unacceptable ambiguity. Most of the federal circuit courts have continued
to make these errors or have failed to clarify the standard even after Justice
O'Connor's clear admonition in Williams in April 2000. Recently, the Fifth
Circuit and the District Court of Maryland explicitly required
preponderance for proving prejudice." Over the past year, the First Circuit
has been ambiguous and inconsistent6 During the past two years, the
Third, Seventh, 27 Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have not once explicitly
recognized that Strickland requires less than preponderance to demonstrate
699. The Indiana Supreme Court stated unequivocally, "[a]s a threshold matter, we reject
Coleman's claim that he is entitled to de novo review because he presents mixed questions of law
and fact." Id. at 699. The court cited a brief passage in Williams to justify this conclusion. Id.
(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 371). To the contrary, this passage in Williams makes it remarkably
clear that the Virginia Supreme Court was accepting a "factual determination," rather than a
determination on a mixed question. The Virginia Supreme Court also held that "both the
performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness test are mixed questions of fact
and law" not binding on appeals. Williams v. Taylor, 487 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Va. 1997) (quoting
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1986)). In general, the Indiana Supreme Court
has consistently refused to review ineffectiveness claims de novo and has imposed inappropriately
difficult burdens upon petitioners. E.g., Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 784 (Ind. 1999);
Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. 1995).
23. Texas's highest criminal court has rejected de novo review even more explicitly. State v.
Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
24. In four cases over the last decade, the Fifth Circuit has explicitly required a
preponderance of the evidence. Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding a
death sentence); James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1995); Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 984
(5th Cir. 1994) (upholding a death sentence); Jernigan v, Collins, 980 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir.
1992). The First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have also erred in requiring preponderance. Mills
v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1020 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (upholding a death sentence); Nave v. Delo, 62
F.3d 1024, 1037 (8th Cir. 1995); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (lst Cir. 1993). The
Seventh Circuit recently has shown some confusion about the prejudice standard, Paters v. United
States, 159 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1998) (Rovner, J., concurring), and has held that Strickland
"usually" requires a preponderance of the evidence, Rosenwald v. United States, 898 F.2d 585,
587 (7th Cir. 1990).
25. Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
2220 (2001); Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2000) ("The defendant bears
the burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that he was deprived of the right of
effective counsel."), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1129 (2001); Obayanju v. United States, 120 F.
Supp. 2d 546, 548 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2000). Full dates are provided for some cases throughout
these notes to signify whether the decisions were handed down after Williams v. Taylor.
26. Compare Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Cody must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his counsel unreasonably erred in permitting him to plead
guilty, and that prejudice resulted."), with Gonzdlez-Soberal v. United States, 244 F.3d 273, 277
(1 st Cir. 2001) (citing the passage in Strickland that rejected the preponderance standard).
27. The Seventh Circuit generally fails to clarify the Strickland prejudice standard. But see
Reeves v. United States, 255 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams for its rejection of the
preponderance standard, but rejecting the petitioner's ineffectiveness claim).
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prejudice.28 The Tenth Circuit has clarified this once,29 and the Eleventh just
twice.3" The Second Circuit,3 the Fourth Circuit,32 and the Sixth Circuit33
have quoted the passage from Williams about the proper prejudice standard,
but these circuits generally also fail to clarify the Strickland standard. A
survey of state courts reveals several dozen cases requiring
preponderance,' with Texas3" and Iowa" courts as the worst offenders.
II
This evidence suggests a double crisis in criminal defense: a crisis of
ineffective assistance of counsel, compounded by a crisis of ineffective
judging. This record of judicial error demonstrates that Justice O'Connor's
attempt at clarification in Williams v. Taylor was not sufficient. The
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts must vigilantly review courts'
application of Strickland, in search of these all-too-frequent errors and
ambiguities. In addition to this renewed commitment to policing against
ineffectiveness, either the Court or Congress should impose additional
protections of the fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In
Miranda v. Arizona,37 and again in Dickerson v. United States,38 the Court
recognized that it can create prophylactic rules that are constitutionally
28. My database search for these five circuits covered at least 160 ineffective assistance
cases. These failures provoked a lengthy dissent by Eighth Circuit Judge Donald E. O'Brien.
Hanes v. Dormire, 240 F.3d 694, 703 (8th Cir. 2001) (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
29. Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2001).
30. Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951,960(11th Cir. June 27, 2000); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d
1106, 1143 (11 th Cir. Mar. 16, 2000).
31. Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2000); Francis S. v. Stone, 221
F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2000).
32. Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 689 (4th Cir. 2001).
33. Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 740 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
34. E.g., Gordon v. State, No. CR 99-482, 2001 Ark. LEXIS 213, at *3-4 (Mar. 29, 2001); In
re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230 (2001); Short v. State, 13 P.3d 1253, 1255 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 4,
2000); Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001); State v. Hess, 622 N.W.2d 891, 902
(Neb. 2001).
35. E.g., Mehmood v. State, No. 14-00-00115-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4095, at *4 (June
21, 2001); Salas v. State, No. 04-98-00895-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3536, at *3 (May 31,
2001); Washington v. State, No. 04-99-00463-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2683, at *7 (Apr. 25,
2001); Bryant v. State, No. 14-00-00508-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1759, at *4-5 (Mar. 15,
2001). Texas courts repeatedly hold that "[t]he Strickland test requires [that] a defendant
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) defense counsel's performance was
deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's case to such a degree the
defendant was deprived of a fair trial." Salas, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3536, at *3.
36. E.g., State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001); State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d
587, 593 (Iowa Sept. 7, 2000); State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa July 6, 2000); State v.
Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa July 6, 2000).
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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necessary for "safeguard[ing] a fundamental trial right," 39 and as the Court
noted in Miranda, Congress can always increase the protections of those
rights.4" The crisis of ineffective counsel and the courts' failure to protect
Sixth Amendment rights demand prophylactic measures. Focusing on
Strickland's prejudice prong, I offer two proposals for all ineffectiveness
cases, and three for death penalty cases in particular.
First, the Supreme Court should require all courts to state explicitly that
they are reviewing ineffective assistance claims de novo. This rule would
improve compliance with Strickland, prevent tangled webs of heightened
standards such as those seen in Coleman, and simplify the appeals process.
Second, courts should have to state explicitly that the standard for
prejudice is below preponderance. Currently, the failure to explain the term
"reasonable probability" too often does a great disservice to petitioners,
because the term itself is misleading. Law dictionaries and lay dictionaries
associate "probability" with "more likely than not" and "preponderance,"
often suggesting an even higher burden.41 In other contexts, courts around
the country have interpreted "probability" as "more likely than not" and as
"a preponderance." 42 Thus, "probability" was a poor word choice in
Strickland. If a court invokes Strickland's reasonable probability standard
without explaining that this burden is less than "preponderance" or "more
likely than not," the presumption should be that such a court is applying the
standard incorrectly. Preferably, the Supreme Court or Congress could
change the phrasing entirely, because the word "probability" is so
confusing. In terms of crude percentages as a measure of proof, the
Supreme Court in Strickland was roughly trying to convey some percentage
between fifty-one percent (preponderance) and some very small percentage,
say, one percent (reasonable doubt). I would suggest that "reasonable
39. Id. at 440 n.5 (citing Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993), in ruling that
Miranda's prophylactic rule was a constitutionally based protection of Fifth Amendment rights
not subject to legislative repeal).
40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 490.
41. Black's Law Dictionary defines "probable" as "[h]aving the appearance of truth; having
the character of probability; appearing to be founded in reason or experience. Having more
evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves
some room for doubt; likely." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
It defines "probability" as "[flikelihood; appearance of reality or truth; reasonable ground of
presumption[;] a condition or state created when there is more evidence in favor.., of a given
proposition than there is against it." Id. Lay dictionaries define the words using terms such as
"likelihood," "more likely than not," and "supported generally but not conclusively by the
evidence." RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1055 (4th ed. 1984) (defining "probable");
ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 838 (4th ed. 1988) (listing synonyms for "probability").
42. E.g., Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993); Kivikovski v. Smart
Prof l Photocopying Corp., No. 00-524-B, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2017, at *5 n.4 (D.N.H. Feb.
20, 2001); Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 557, 564-65 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Breast
Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Coto. 1998); Struckman v. Bums, 534 A.2d 888,
895 (Conn. 1987); Card v. State, 747 A.2d 32, 35 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Cohen v. Yale-New
Haven Hosp., No. 365,908, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2304 (Aug. 31, 2000); Jane Doe Two v.
Zedek, 587 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Neb. 1999).
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possibility" conjures this rough idea of, say, a twenty-five percent chance
much better than "reasonable probability."
While courts should guard against incompetent defense counsel in all
cases, they should be most vigilant in reviewing death sentences. In
Strickland, Justice O'Connor wrote that, "fIflor purposes of describing
counsel's duties," capital sentencing "need not be distinguished from an
ordinary trial." 43 Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that, because "death is
qualitatively different" in its finality, its severity, and the need for
reliability, the reasonable probability standard should be rejected.' Justice
Marshall's dissent should be revisited, and Justice O'Connor has recently
indicated that she is open to these concerns?5
In light of the extensive record of lower courts' errors even in death
penalty cases, a reasonable doubt prejudice standard would send a powerful
message that the Supreme Court will not tolerate incompetent counsel when
a defendant's life is at stake. In addition, the Court should adopt a per se
rule on counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. The
Court has recognized in two major death penalty precedents, Lockett v.
Ohio46 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,47 that defendants are entitled to a
presentation of mitigating evidence. In his Strickland concurrence, Justice
Brennan synthesized this right with the right to counsel, arguing that
defendants have a right to counsel that will investigate and present
mitigating evidence.48 It is now time to create a per se rule to enforce this
duty more clearly. According to this bright-line rule, once the petitioner
establishes the existence of mitigating evidence of some weight (even low
weight), and establishes that counsel failed to investigate reasonably, then
the petitioner will have established a claim of ineffective assistance in the
penalty phase, and will be entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
Finally, jurisdictions with the worst capital defense systems should be
held to a higher standard until they improve. The Innocence Protection Act,
which Congress is now debating, would create a National Commission on
Capital Representation that would evaluate the capital defender system in
43. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
44. Id. at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)). Justice Marshall suggested that the standard should be stated as "a significant chance that
the outcome would have been different." Id. at 717. However, this formulation is still too
ambiguous, because significance can mean even more than preponderance.
45. In a speech expressing many concerns about the country's death penalty system, she
commented, "[p]erhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death
cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used." Justice O'Connor
on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A16.
46. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
47. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
48. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Comment, Washington v.
Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1544, 1549 (1983).
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each jurisdiction.49 In states that the Commission deems unacceptably
deficient in providing capital defense, courts should require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice in the death penalty phase.
Alternatively, the prejudice requirement could be suspended entirely for
death penalty review in those states, so that a mere finding of deficiency
would suffice for a new sentencing.5 ° There is precedent for courts using
even more drastic procedural changes in response to gross inadequacies,
such as shifting the burden to the state to prove that counsel was not
deficient, in order to encourage improved public defender systems.5
One might argue that these reforms would create a problem for the
administration of justice. However, justice demands some inconvenience,
especially when a death sentence is at stake. Furthermore, per se rules
improve judicial economy and clarity of review; in contrast, courts
currently must consider the case in its entirety. One might also offer a
separation of powers argument against Congress's intervention into judicial
procedure, but this proposal is far less of an intervention than the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, or the harsh
habeas reforms in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act52 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.53 If
Congress can intervene to restrict defendants' rights, it can intervene to
protect them, too. A more potent counterargument is that if some courts are
already misapplying or incompletely citing standards, these doctrinal
reforms are unlikely to correct the problem. These changes, however, will
no longer allow judges to hide behind procedural veils, deferring to lower
court opinions and erecting impossible burdens of proof-they will have to
confront the question of life and death more directly. If these judges uphold
death sentences, at least they will be applying a standard more clearly and
consistently, without the moral crutch of deferential review. And perhaps
these judges, every once in a while, will enforce the right to counsel more
than nominally.
-Jed Handelsman Shugerman
49. Innocence Protection Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. §§ 201-203 (2001).
50. Such a plan would balance federalism and the enforcement of the Sixth Amendment,
consistent with Miranda's encouragement for states to create their own mechanisms for protecting
Fifth Amendment rights. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998). Similarly, states should be encouraged to
create their own institutions and mechanisms to improve the quality of defense, with Congress and
the federal courts playing a supervisory role, and intervening only in extreme cases.
51. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381
(Ariz. 1984) (" [Sbo long as the County of Mohave fails to [improve its defense counsel system],
there will be an inference that the adequacy of representation is adversely affected by the
system."); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1173 (Okla. 1990) (proposing another solution).
52. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22,
28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and
18 U.S.C.).
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